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The main goal of this paper is to develop a formal analysis which accOlmts for both 
the strong similarities, as well as a number of unexpected differences between two 
types of generic sentences in English, which minimally contrast in the type of subject: 
those with indefinite singular subj ects, as in ( 1 )  (IS sentences, henceforth), and those 
with bare plural subj ects, as in (2) (BI' sentences, henceforth) : 
( 1 )  A grizzly bear snores very loudly (- An IS sentence) 
(2) Grizzly bears snore very loudly (- A BP sentence) 
I start (in section 1 )  by reviewing the uniform quantificational-modal 
representation traditionally assigned to minimal pairs like ( 1 )  and (2), and its 
advantages . In section 2 I present the problem for the uniform representation, namely 
a number of old, as well as newly observed differences between such minimal pairs . 
Section 3 deals with several attempts in the literature to characterize and explain these 
differences, and their shortcomings . My alternative account of both the similarities 
and differences between the two types of sentences is to take them, on the one hand, 
to have the same basic semantic structure (headed by a modalized generic quantifier, 
Gen), but to differ in the type of modality, i .e .  the type of accessibility relation 
restricting Gen. The intuition behind this alternative, as well as the formal analysis are 
presented in section 4 .  In section 5 I show how the formal analysis accounts for the 
full range of similarities and differences between IS and BP sentences, presented 
above. Finally in section 6 I suggest a preliminary direction for deriving the semantic 
difference between the two types of sentences (in terms of their availability with the 
two distinct accessibility relations) from the distinct semantics of the IS and BP noun 
phrases subjects in these sentences. 
1. The uniform representation and its advantages 
Minimally contrasting IS and BP sentences, like ( 1 )  and (2) above, look very very 
similar, in fact - almost synonymous. Indeed, almost all theories of genericity analyze 
them the same, as equally expressing nonaccidental genericity (I-genericity, in Krifka 
& Gerstner' s 1987 terms , or Characterizing Genericity, in Krifka et aI' s 1995 terms), 
i .e .  as having some version or other of the tripartite structure in (3), suggested By 
Chierchia 1 995 (where Gen is a nonovert unselective quantifier binding the individual 
(x), and situation (s) variables introduced by the subject predicate and the VP 
predicate respectively, and C is a variable yielding contextually relevant situations 
involving individuals) 1 :  
(3) Gen, x,s [grizzly bear (x) 1\ C(s ,x)] -+ [snore loudly (s,x)] 
Paraphrase : "It generally holds for individual grizzly bears and contextually 
relevant (e. g. sleeping) situations involving them, that such individuals snore 
loudly in such situations" 
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As for the semantics of Gen, it is generally assumed (in e .g. Dahl 1 975, 
Wilkinson 1 99 1 ,  Chierchia 1 995,  Krifka 1 995) that it is universal and modalized, i .e.  
that it universally quantifies not only over individuals and situations, but also over 
possible worlds, restricted by some sort of modal base (in Kratzer' s  198 1  terms), or 
accessibility relation. Since I deal a lot with this accessibility relation below, I wrote 
(3) explicitly as in (4) : 
(4) Vw' [w' is  appropriately accessible from w] � 
[Vx,s [grizzly bear (x,w' ) /\ C(s,x,w' )] � [snore loudly (s,x,w)]] 
Paraphrase :"In all worlds w' appropriately accessible from the world of 
evaluation, w, every grizzly bear, in any contextually relevant situation (e.g. 
every sleeping situation) is snQring very loudly". 
Following Kratzer' s  1 98 1  analysis of modal verbs, Krifka et al 1 995 suggest 
that the basic accessibility relation of the generic quantifier in (4) is similar to that of 
modal verbs like must, i .e .  that it is supplied by context ' and can vary between 
episternic, deontic, stereotypical, etc. 
The uniform representation in (4) indeed successfully captures some important 
similarities between minimally contrasting IS and BP sentences. Specifically, the 
quantification over individuals and situations captures the fact that both types of 
sentences are felt to express generalizations over such entities2. The fact that the 
universal statement in (4) (over individuals and situations) is under the scope of a 
modal operator, i.e. it is required to hold in a set of accessible worlds, rather than 
merely in the actual world, captures the intuition that the generalizations expressed by 
both IS and BP sentences like ( 1 )  and (2) are taken to be "law-like", or 
"nonaccidental". Among other things, this is indicated by the fact that both ( 1 )  and (2) 
above support the counterfactual statement in (5): 
(5) If this were a grizzly bear it would probably snore very loudly as well. 
The variability of the accessibility relation, i .e .  the fact that in each case the 
universal statement is  required to hold in a different set of worlds, successfully 
captures the fact that both IS and BP sentences can express generalizations of 
different "flavors", e. g. epistemic ones as in ( 1 )  and (2) above, and as in (6), 
normative, or deontic ones, as in (7), definitions, or linguistic ones, as in (8), etc. : 
(6) Cats have four legs / A cat has four legs 
(7) Dogs owners pay tax on them / A dog owner pays tax on it 
(8) Bachelors are never married men / A bachelor is never married man 
In (6), for example, the universal statement (in this case "every dog has four 
legs in all situations") holds in all worlds which are epistemically accessible from the 
actual world w, i . e . it follows from what is known in w. In (7) it holds in all worlds 
which are deontically accessible, i. e .  it follows form what is commanded in w. And in 
(8) it holds in all worlds which are linguistically accessible from w, i .e. where the 
language is interpreted as in w. 
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2. The problem for the uniform representatio n :  differences between minimally 
contrasting IS and BP sentences. 
However, despite the success of the unifonn representation to account for the 
similarities between minimally contrasting IS and BP sentences, it cannot account for 
a number of differences between them. 
The observations about some of these differences are, in fact, rather old. 
Burton Roberts 1 977, for example, observed that minimal pairs like ( 1 )  and (2), or 
like (9) and ( 1 0) are not really synonymous. IS sentences express a high level of 
law-likeness : "definitional" or analytic statements, so (9), for example,  can be 
paraphrased as "To be a table is to have four legs". In contrast, BP sentences, like ( 1 0) 
can also express a lower level of. "law likeness", "descriptive" or "inductive" 
generalizations, about patterns (rather than rules)), concerning, e .g. the number of legs 
that tables generally have: 
(9) A table has four legs 
( 1 0) Tables have four legs 
Moreover, the felicity of IS sentences (under the generic interpretation) , 
appears to be much more restricted than that of their BP counterparts. For example , 
Lawler 1 973 , Burton Roberts 1 977 and others observed that IS sentences as III 
( l 1 a)-( l 1 d) are odd, or infelicitous as generic , whereas the BP sentences III 
( 12a)-( 12d) are perfectly felicitous under this reading (although probably false): 
( 1 1 ) a. # A madrigal is popular 
b.  # A room is square 
c .  # An uncle is garrulous 
d. # A man is blond 
(12) a. Madrigals are popular 
b. Rooms are square 
c. Uncles are garrulous 
d. Men are blond 
More differences can be seen with IS and BP sentences whose subject express 
what I intuitively call "extremely unnatural classes", as in ( 1 3) and ( 1 4), respectively: 
( 1 3 )  a .  A Norwegian student whose name ends with ' s '  o r  ' g '  wears thick green 
socks . (Salient existential reading of the subject) 
b. An American linguist born to a famous singer in June 1 954 writes very 
technical papers (Salient existential reading of the subject) 
( 14) a. Norwegian students whose name ends with ' s' or ' g' wear thick green 
socks . (Salient generic reading of the subject) 
b .  American linguists born i n  June 1 954 to  famous singers write very 
technical papers (Salient generic reading of the subject) 
As can be seen in ( 13), with IS sentences such "extremely unnatural" subjects 
get a salient existential interpretation (in fact they are interpreted as wide scope 
existentials, e . g. about specific Norwegian students), and the sentences themselves are 
odd as generic .  In contrast, with such BP sentences, as in ( 1 4), the subjects are freely 
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interpreted as generic, (e. g. ( 1 4a) is perfectly fine as a generalization about Norwegian 
students whose names end with ' s '  or ' g' ) . 
A similar pattern can be seen in "temporally restricted generics" (Greenberg 
1 998, 2002). Unlike the IS sentences in ( 1 5), which are infelicitous under the generic 
reading of the subject, the minimally contrasting BP counterparts in ( 1 6) are perfectly 
fine3 : 
( 1 5) a. # An Italian restaurant is closed tonight 
b. # An accountant is very busy this week 
( 1 6) a. Italian restaurants are closed tonight 
b. Accountants are very busy this week 
It is clear that the uniform representation in (4) above, cannot handle these 
differences between IS and BP sentences. In order to account for the data, there are 
two basic questions we need to answer: (A) How can we characterize these 
differences ? (B) How can we explain them, i .e .  derive them from independently 
motivated differences between IS and BP noun phrases ? 
The answer to neither question is trivial or easy. To see that, let me look first 
at some traditional attempts to account for the data. 
3. Previous attempts to characterize and explain the differences between IS and 
BP sentences, and their shortcommings 
Based on data as in ( 1 1 )  and ( 12) above, Lawler 1 973 suggested that IS sentences are 
felicitous only when their VP express properties which are "essential" or "inherent" of 
the subjects,  whereas BP ones have no such restriction - they can freely combine with 
purely "accidental", noninherent properties. According to Lawler, then, ( l l a) above, 
repeated here as ( 17a), is infelicitous as generic since being popular is an accidental, 
noninherent property of madrigals, whereas ( 1 7b) is fine since being polyphonic is 
essential ! inherent of madrigals :  
( 17) a. #A madrigal is popular 
b. A madrigal is polyphonic 
This intuitive characterization is quoted in a number of generic theories. 
However, as shown in Cohen 200 1 1 999 and Greenebrg 2002, the main problem with 
it is that there are, in fact, many perfectly felicitous IS sentences which combine with 
clearly accidental nonessential , noninherent properties, like ( 1 8a-b), or which, 
moreover, combine with clearly false properties of their subjects (like 1 9a-b) : 
( 1 8) a. A carpenter earns very little .  
b. A refrigerator costs $ 1 000 
( 1 9) a. A dog has three legs 
b. A pine tree has wide leave 
( 1 8b), for example, is perfectly tine as generic although costing $ 1 000 is not 
considered an essential property of refrigerators. Moreover, one clearly wouldn't want 
to claim that having three legs is an essential property of dogs, or that having wide 
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leaves is an essential property of pine trees, but nonetheless , ( 1 9a,b) are perfectly 
felicitous as generic. 
What these problems suggest is that the essential I nonessential distinction is 
not the right way to "slice the cake" correctly, i.e. to distinguish between felicitous IS 
sentences (e.g. the clearly false ( 1 9a)), and infelicitous ones (like ( l Id)). Before 
presenting an alternative characterization, however, let us look at an attempt to 
explain these differences, namely Krifka et aI ' s  1 995 suggestion to assign minimally 
contrasting IS and BP sentences two completely different semantic structures4. 
Specifically, the claim is that IS sentences are necessarily characterizing (1-) 
generics , i .e .  must have a modalized generic quantifier ,  of the type described in 
section 1 above , and that the modal nature of this quantifier somehow leads to the 
"analyticity" and "essentiality" restriGtions on them. In contrast, all BP sentences can 
have a nonquantificational , nonmodal Direct Kind Predication structure, and the 
abseence of modal operator enables them to be interpreted as generics even when 
combining with "nonessential" I "accidental" properties . 
Now, Krifka & Gerstner 1 987 independently showed that there are indeed BP 
sentences which are interpreted as generic,  although they lack a modalized generic 
quantifier. E.g. (20a) clearly does not express a nonaccidental generalization over 
individual Dodos, and hence should not be represented as in (2Db). Instead, it is 
usually represented as in (20c), where the VP property is directly predicated of the 
kind, denoted by the BP NP "dodos" (represented with capital letters), i .e .  as a Direct 
Kind Predication Structure. The ungrammaticality of (20d) shows that .unlike BP 
sentences IS ones cannot be interpreted as such Direct Kind Predication structures 
(presumably since, unlike BP NPs, IS ones cannot denote kinds):  
(20) a. Dodos became extinct in 1 7 1 3  
b. * Gen x,s [Dodos (x) /\ C(s,x)] � [became extinct in 1713  (s,x)] 
c. became extinct in 17 13  (DODOS) 
d. * A dodo became extinct in 1 7 1 3  
These assumptions are by now standard . The innovation in Kritka et al' s  
suggestion is i n  applying this nonmodalized, nonquantificational Direct Kind 
Predication structure not only to BP sentences like (20a) but also to e .g. (2 Ia), and 
presumably also to (22a) and (23a) :  
(2 1 )  a .  Uncles are garrulous 
b. garrulous (UNCLES) 
(22) a. Men are blond 
b. Blond (MEN) 
(23 )  a .  Italian restaurants are closed tonight 
b. closed tonight (ITALIAN RESTAURANTS) 
There are two basic problems with Krifka et ai ' s  approach. Firstly, the mere 
presence of a modalized generic quantifier in the semantics of IS sentences, with the 
traditional epistemic, deontic, stereotypical etc. accessibility relations used by Krifka 
et aI, is simply not enough to explain the restrictions on their felicity. Specifically, the 
presence of such a modalized quantifier wrongly predicts IS sentences like (24a) to 
have exactly the same status as e.g. (24b) :  
(24) a. # A man is blond 
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b. A dog has three legs 
The reason is that neither universal statements in (25a) and (25b) 
(corresponding to (24a) and (24b), respectively), follow from what is known, 
commanded, stereotyped etc. in w, i . e. neither of them holds in all worlds which are 
epistemically, deontically, stereotypically, etc. from the actual world w: 
(25) a. Every man is blond 
b. Every dogs has three legs 
Thus, while Lewler' s  essential / nonessential distinction wrongly predicts both 
(24a) and (24b) to be equally i�licitous (since in both the VP expresses a 
nonessential property of the subj ect), Kritka et al' s  suggestion in fact wrongly predict 
both IS sentences to be equally felicitous (and false). As I will show below, a more 
sophisticated accessibility relation has to be used in order to "slice the cake" correctly 
i .e .  to distinguish between felicitous and infelicitous IS sentences. 
The second problem has to do with Kritka et al's  analysis of BP sentences like 
(2 1 )-(23) above. In section ( 1 )  we saw that the uniform representation (in e.g. «(4)) 
above accounts nicely for the similarities between minimally contrasting IS and BP 
sentences, but cannot handle the differences between them. Here we get the opposite 
situation: assigning such minimal pairs two completely different semantic structures 
attempts to account for the differences between them, but at the same time completely 
ignores the strong similarities between them. Specifically, assigning a 
nonquantificational, nonmodalized representation to BP sentences like (2 l a), (22a) 
and (24a) cannot account for the fact that, unlike e . g. Dodos are extinct, they are 
similar to IS sentences in expressing generalizations over individuals (individual 
uncles, men and Italian restaurants), and furthermore in supporting counterfactuals, 
e .g. (26), (27) and (28), respectively: 
(26) If this were an uncle, it would be garrulous as well (pointing at a person who is 
not an uncle) 
(27) If this were a man, he would be blond as well (pointing at a woman) 
(28) If this were an Italian restaurant, it would be closed tonight as well (pointing at 
an Indian restaurant) 
These facts suggest that, unlike Kritka et ai' s  suggestion, the semantics of 
such BP sentences does contain a quantifier, which, moreover, has a modal nature. 
4. An alternative solution:  Two types of nonaccidental genericity 
What we want, then, is to fmd a way to account for both the similarities and the 
differences between minimally contrasting IS and BP sentences. To do that I suggest 
that both types of sentences express nonaccidental genericity, but that they differ in 
the type of nonaccidentalness they express. More formally, that both types of 
sentences have the same basic, quantificational-modal, representation, of the sort we 
saw in section 1 above, but they differ in the type of modality - i .e .  the type of 
accessibility relation available for them. 
For a start, let ' s  assume that both IS and BP sentences in (29a) and (29b) will 
have the same semantic structure as in (30). The difference between them will lie in 
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the underlined part of the formula in (30), namely in the decision of which worlds 
(w' ) will be considered appropriately accessible from w. The following sections 
specify how these two accessibility relations should be characterized: 
(29) a. A boy doesn't cry 
b. Boys don't cry 
(30) 'Vw' [w' is appropriately accessible from w] � 
['Vx,s [boy(x,w') /\ C(s,x,w')] � [.cry (s,x,w')]] 
Paraphrase: In all worlds appropriately accessible from w, every boy, in all 
contextually relevant situations, doesn't cry. 
4. 1 The intuitive difference between minimally contrasting IS and BP sentences 
Let me start by developing the intuition. The idea is that there are, in fact, two types 
of nonaccidental generalizations which are syntactically encoded in English5 through 
the distinction between IS and BP sentences. I call them "in virtue of' and 
"descriptive" generalizations6. 
IS sentences only express "in virtue of' generalizations, asserting that the 
generalization is nonaccidentally true in virtue of some property, associated with the 
subject property, that the speaker has in mind, and the listener is supposed to 
accommodate. (3 1 a), for example, can be intuitively paraphrased as in (3 1 b) :  
(3 1 ) a. A boy doesn't cry 
b .  The generalization "Every boy doesn't cry (in any relevant situation)" is 
nonaccidentally true in virtue of some property, associated with the 
property of being a boy (e. g. the property of being tough) 
There are also IS sentences where the choice of the "in virtue of' property is 
not clear from the start. Hearing (32a), for example, one can accommodate any of the 
properties in (32b): 
(32) a. A woman in this place doesn't walk alone outside 
b .  In  virtue of  following the local religious or social norms . .  . 
In virtue of living in such a dangerous and violent place . .  . 
In virtue of being so beautiful and charming. " (so every woman in this 
place is always accompanied by some man) 
If uttered "out of the blue" it is not clear which "in virtue of' property the 
speaker has in mind, and the listener may end up accommodating the wrong "in virtue 
of' property, i .e .  not the one the speaker had in mind. But the crucial assumption is 
that uttering such a sentence, the speaker really has in mind some "in virtue of' 
property which the listeners should accommodate to fully understand the sentence. 
In contrast to IS sentences,  BP ones are potentially ambiguous. The can 
express "in virtue of' generalizations, just like their IS counterparts, but also the 
second, "descriptive" type of generalizations, where they merely assert that "there is a 
pattern here", i .e .  that the generalization is simply not accidental, not limited to the 
actual set of circumstances, but is expected to be true in other, nonactuaI 
circumstances as welL 
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For example, although the BP (33a) can express an "in virtue of' 
generalization, just like there IS counterparts (paraphrased in (3 1 a) above), on the 
basis of observing the behavior of many boys a speaker may also use it to express a 
descriptive generalization, paraphrased as in (33b): 
(33) a Boys don't cry 
b. The generalization "every boy doesn't cry (in all relevant, e.g. "tear 
inducing" situations)" is not accidental : not limited to actual boys in actual 
(relevant) situations, but is expected to hold for other, nonactual boys in 
other, nonactual (relevant) situations, as well ."  
Crucially, on the descriptive reading (33a) does not involve any specification 
of the property in virtue of which boys do not cry. Even if the speaker has in mind 
some such "in virtue of' property, it is not an integral part of his assertion, and the 
listeners are not committed to accommodated it . All he claims is that "this is not 
accidental", i .e . not limited to actual boys and actual situations only. 
As said above, this intuitive difference between the "in virtue of' and 
descriptive generalizations expressed by IS and BP sentence can be fruitfully and 
formally captured by positing two different accessibility relations which can restrict 
the modalized Gen operators . The next two sections illustrate how this can be done. 
4.2 The "in virtue of' accessibility relation of IS sentences 
Following Kratzer 198 1  ideas about circumstantial modality, and Brennan ' s  1 993 
work on modal verbs with root interpretation, I will take the basic accessibility 
relation of IS sentences to be systematically restricted by the "in virtue of' property . 
Specifically, the worlds we quantify over are those where every individual with the 
subject property has the "in virtue of' property. 
Suppose you hear for example (34a), and the "in virtue of' property you 
accommodate is "being tough". In this case the accessible worlds are those where 
every boy is tough, so the sentence has the truth conditions in (34b): 
(34 )  a. A boy does not cry (in virtue of " be tough) 
b. 'v"w' ['v"x [boy (x,w' )] � [tough(x,w')] ] � 
['v"x,s [boy(x,w') /\ C(s ,x,w')] � [-,cry (s,x,w')]] 
Paraphrase :  In all worlds where every boy i s  tough, every boy (in all 
relevant situations) doesn't cry. 
Similarly, if you hear (35a), and accommodate "in virtue of having a four 
legged genetic makeup", the sentence will have the truth conditions in (35b): 
(35) a .  A dog has four legs (in virtue of " has a 4 legged genetic makeup) 
b.  'v"w' [V'x [dog (x,w' )] � [has a 4 legged genetic makeup (x,w' )]] � 
[V'x,s [dog (x,w' ) /\ C(s,x,w')] � [has 4 legs (s,x,w' )]] 
In general, then, if we take the subject property to be "P, the VP property to be 
AQ and the chosen "in virtue of' property to be AS, the truth conditions of an IS 
sentences seem to be the ones in (36) 
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(36) An IS sentence is true in w iff: 
Vw' [Vx [P(x,w' )] --jo [S(x.w' )] ]  --jo 
[Vx,s [P(x,w' ) 1\ C(s,x,w' )] --jo [Q (s,x,w' )] ]  
This, however, i s  clearly not enough, because o f  two related problems. Firstly, 
the accessibility relation in (36) does not specify at all how the worlds quantified over 
(w' in (36» are accessible from the world of evaluation w, and after all,  this is what 
we want to show in an accessibility relation. In addition, there is no hmitation, or 
restriction in (36) on the choice of the "in virtue of', I'·S property, so in principle any 
arbitrary or even far fetched property can be chosen. This, however, may wrongly 
lead all IS sentences to be true . A clearly false sentence like (37a), for example, may 
be interpreted as in (37b), and thus wr<>ngly predicted to be true : 
(37) a. A dog has three legs 
b. "In all worlds where every dog has a three legged genetic makeup, every 
dog has three legs" 
The solution to both these problems is the same. In accommodating an "in 
virtue of' property, we cannot really choose any arbitrary, far-fetched property we 
want. The property we choose has to meet some criteria imposed by our real world 
knowledge. For a start I assume that we can only choose those properties which, given 
our knowledge of the actual world, are "associated" with the subject property. 
We should now define precisely the nature of the "association" relation 
between two properties, relative to a world w. Take for example the property of being 
a boy. In our world we associate with it a number of properties, e .g. being male, 
loving sports, being tough, etc . Clearly not all such properties are true of all boys in 
the actual world. In actuality, for example, only some (maybe half) of the boys love 
sports, and only a minority of the boys are really tough. On the other hand, we will 
not associate with the property of being a judge something like "hating tomatoes", 
even if it happens to be the case that all actual judges hate tomatoes. What determines, 
then, whether a certain property is associated with another property in our world is not 
the actual state of affairs, in the actual world, but rather our beliefs, norms, 
stereotypes , etc . about the actual world. We associate being tough with being a boy, 
for example, since it follows from the norms in our actual world that every boy is 
tough. I .e. the universal statement "every boy is tough" holds, not in the actual worlds 
itself, but in all worlds which are normatively accessible from it. In stil l  other words , 
this universal statement is a (normative) necessity in w. These considerations lead to 
the definition in (3 8): 
(38) Formal definition of "associated properties" : 
AS is associated with Ap in w iff there is a "Kratzerian", accessibility function 
j from worlds to sets of propositions (e.g. epistemic, deontic, stereotypical, 
legal, etc . )  S .t. VW" [w" Rj· wl � [Vx [P(x,w")] --jo [S(x,w")l] 
Paraphrase : AS is associated with Ap in w iff Vx P(x)�S(x) holds in all worlds 
epistemically accessible from w (where the facts known in w hold), OR 
deontically accessible from w (where what is commanded in w holds), OR 
stereotypically accessible from w - (where the stereotypes in w ho ld), etc . 
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Integrating this definition of associated properties into the truth conditions of 
IS sentences, what we get is something like (39): 
(39) An IS sentence is true in w iff: 
::V'S "iw' ["ix [P(x, w')] � [Sex. w') /\ AS is associated in w with AP]] � 
["ix,s [P(x,w')  /\ C(s,x,w' )] � [Q (s,x,w' )]] 
Paraphrase: An IS sentence is true in a world w iff there is a property AS, s .  t. in 
all worlds w' , where every member of the subject set (P) has S, and, 
furthermore, AS is associated in w with the I\p property (given (3 8)), then 
every member of the subject set, in all relevant situations, is a member of the 
VP set (Q) as well . 
The IS sentence in (37a), for example, will have now the truth conditions in 
(40 ), instead of (37b ) : 
(40) There is a property I\S, S.t. in all worlds where every dog has S,  and this 
property I\S is associated in w with being a dog, every dog in any 
situation has three legs 
Now there are many properties we associate in our world with being a dog: 
having a tail, having a 4 legged genetic makeup, being loyal, barking, etc. Crucially, 
however, neither of them leads all dogs to have 3 legs. Thus, we correctly predict that 
this sentence is false. 
Notice also that adding the "association" requirements into the truth conditions 
means :that the semantics of IS sentences involves, in fact, two levels of modality: 
The basic set of accessible worlds Cw' in (39)) is defined as those in which "every P 
has S" holds. But the choice of the "in virtue of' I\S, property depends, in turn, on a 
more traditional, "Kratzerian" accessibility relation, which gives a set of worlds where 
what is known, commanded, etc. in w holds (w" in the (3 8)). Put in other words, in 
order to guarantee that the "in virtue of' AS property is not an arbitrary, far fetched 
property from the point of view of our real world knowledge, we require that the basic 
set of accessible worlds w' we quantify over (where "every P is S" holds) is a superset 
of the set of worlds which are epistemically, deontically, stereotypically etc. 
accessible from the world of evaluation w. 
This "double modality" captures the intuition that a speaker of an IS sentence 
not only asserts that a certain generalization is nonaccidental (i .e .  say that "every P is 
Q" holds in a set of accessible worlds w'), but also that it is true in virtue of another 
generalization - "every P is S" - which is itself nonaccidental (i .e .  a necessity) w.r.t. 
our world. 
4 .3  The accessib ility relation of "descriptive " generalizations 
As claimed above, BP sentences can express "in virtue of' generalizations, just like 
their IS counterparts, thus having truth conditions as in (39) above. Unlike IS 
sentences, however, they can also express "descriptive" generalizations, where no "in 
virtue of' property is involved. The descriptive reading of (4 1a), for example, can be 
paraphrased as in (4 1 b): 
(4 1 ) a. Librarians whose names end with 't '  speak very quickly 
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b. The generalization "every librarian whose name ends with ' t ' speaks very 
quickly" is nonaccidental - not limited to the actual world - but is 
expected to hold in other, nonactual worlds as well. 
The question we need to answer now is what are these accessible worlds ? 
Specifically, in which aspects are they like our actual worlds ? Which elements of the 
actual worlds are "copied" into them ? 
The answer I suggest is that since, unlike what happens with "in virtue of' 
generalizations, with descriptive ones do not specify (or even know) in virtue of what 
the generalization is true, we don't specify (or even know) what actual-world 
elements are "copied" into the accessible worlds. Put in other words, the accessibility 
relation remains vague. , 
I suggest to formally capture this vagueness using Lewis's  1 986 overall, 
maximal similarity, which is inherently vague. The truth conditions of a descriptive 
generic like (4 1 a), for example, will be those in (42): 
(42) 'iw' [Max Cw' , w) ] � 
['ix,s [ librarians whose names end with 't '(x,w') /\ C(s,x,w')] � [speak 
quickly (s,x,w')] ] 
where Max(w' ,w) holds iff w' i s  maximally similar to w except from what 
is needed to possibly allow for the existence of a different population of (e. g. 
more, less, or totally different) librarians whose names end with 't' . 
5. Accounting for differences between minimal pairs of IS and BP sentences. 
We can now see how the two distinct accessibility relations help accounting for the 
differences between minimally contrasting IS and BP sentences we looked at above. 
Firstly, the stronger vs . weaker "law-likeness" expressed by IS and BP 
sentences, respectively, reported by Burton Roberts 1 977, result from the different 
degree of similarity between the accessible worlds and the actual one, in the two types 
of accessibility relations. IS sentences are felt to express strong rules since the 
universal generalization over individuals and situations is required to hold in worlds 
which preserve a very specific and narrow aspect of the actual world: those where a 
certain epistemic, deontic stereotypical, etc. necessity about the actual world (of the 
form "every P member has S) holds. On the other hand, although in descriptive BP 
sentences the universal generalization has to hold, not merely in the actual world, but 
in a set of possible worlds, these possible worlds preserve a much wider range of 
characteristics of the actual world. These are those worlds which are maximally 
similar to w (except from possibly having other P members) This "wide perspective" 
similarity to the actual world is what leads to the double nature of descriptive BP 
sentences:  expressing nonaccidental generalizations, on the one hand, which on the 
other hand are also "descriptive" and more about actuality than the generalizations 
expressed by corresponding IS sentences. 
We can now also show why IS sentences like (43a), with subject expressing 
"extremely unnatural classes", have a salient existential reading, and are odd as 
generic. Given our claims in section (4.2 ), (43a) will have truth conditions as in (43b) : 
(43 ) a. # A Norwegian student whose name ends with ' s' or ' wears thick 
green socks 
Two TYPES OF QUANTIFICATIONAL MODALIZED GENERICITY 
b. :V'S 'v'w' ['v'x [Norwegian student whose name ends with ' s ' or ' g ' (x)] 
� [S(x,w' ) 1\ AS is assoc iated in w with A Norwegian student whose 
name ends with ' s '  or ' g ' ] ]  � 
[\ix,s [Norwegian student whose name ends with 's '  or ' g' (x,w' ) 1\ 
C(s,x,w')] � [wear thick green socks (s,x,w')]] 
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paraphrase: (43 a) is true in w iff there is an AS property S.t.  in all worlds 
where every Norwegian Student whose name ends with ' s' or ' g' has AS, 
and AS is associated in w with being a Norwegian Student whose name 
ends with ' s '  or 'g ' ,  every such Norwegian student, in all relevant 
situations, wears thick green sock 
Unlike what happens with e .g. A dog has three legs, where there were many 
properties we could associate with the subject property !\P, but none lead to having the 
VP property ("\Q), here the problem is much more seriQus. Given our real world 
knowledge there is, in fact, no (nontrivial) property which we associate with being a 
Norwegian student whose name ends with ' s '  or ' g' .  This is because the universal 
statement 'v'x [Norwegian student whose name ends with ' s '  or ' g' (x)] [Sex)] does not 
follow from any set of shared known facts, norms, stereotypes etc . ,  . since in our world 
we have no shared knowledge, norms, stereotypes etc. on being a Norwegian student 
whose name ends with ' s ' or ' g' .  In fact, this is exactly what makes such properties to 
feel so "unnatural".  
But if no property is associated with being a Norwegian student whose name 
ends with 's '  or ' g' ,  then no accessible worlds can be found in which to evaluate the 
generalization over individuals and situations . In such a case, however, a 
presupposition that accessible worlds w' exist, which is (conventionally) triggered by 
the universal quantification over worlds, is not met, and this leads to the infelicity of 
(43a), as generic, and to the salient existential reading of the subjece. 
Notice, however, that the "association" requirement on the choice of the "in 
virtue of', AS property is still not enough to explain why IS sentences as in (44) 
mentioned above, are infelicitous, and not merely false like those in (45): 
(44) a. # A man is blond 
b. # An uncle is garrulous 
c. # An Italian restaurant is closed tonight. 
(45) a. A dog has three legs 
b. A Pentium VI computer works very slowly 
c.  A pine tree has wide leaves 
The problem is that the association requirement is equally met in both (44) and 
(45). This because (unlike being, e. g. a Norwegian student whose name ends with ' s '  
or  ' g' )  being an uncle, a man, or  an Itali an  restaurant, just like being a dog, a Pentium 
computer or a pine tree - are very natural properties. They are natural in the sense that 
we associate many properties with them. 
I would like to suggest that what leads to the infelicity of the IS sentences in 
(44) is the failure of an additional presuppositional requirement on the choice and 
accommodation of the "in virtue of', AS property. Intuitively, the idea is that besides 
being not too far-fetched w.r. t. our real world knowledge about the subject property, 
the "in virtue of', !\S property has to be not too far-fetched W.r.t. our real world 
knowledge about the VP property (AQ) as well. Specifically, besides being associated 
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with Ap in w, the chosen AS property should be perceived as a reasonable causer for 
properties of the sort of l\Q8. This can be phrased more precisely as in (46) :  
(46) The additional presuppositional requirement on the choice of AS 
AS is s .t. there is a good possibility (relative to w) that 
[Yx [P(x) 1\ Sex)] � Q(x) ] v [Vx [P(x) /\ Sex)] � -,Q(x) ] 
Paraphrase: AS is s . t. there is a good possibility, from the point of view of our 
world, that either every P individual with S has Q, or every P individual with S 
does not have Q. 
Compare, for example (45a) (A dog has three legs) and (44a) (A man is 
blonfD. In both sentences there is n\> property associated with Ap (being a dog and 
being a man) which is taken to be a "reasonable causer" of the I\Q property itself ( i .e .  
of having three legs, and being blond, respectively) . Nonetheless , when we think 
about properties of the sort of /\Q, we can see that there is a difference between the 
two sentences: We can easily find a property associated with being a dog which is a 
reasonable causer for having a certain number of legs (i. e. a property of the sort of 
"having three legs"), namely having the regular genetic makeup for a certain, specific, 
and fixed number of legs . In contrast, among all the properties we associate with 
being a man there is even no property which we take to reasonably lead all men to be 
blond, or all men not to be blond, i . e .  to reasonably lead to having a certain specific 
and fixed hair color, or any other property of the sort of "being blond". Similarly, 
among all properties we associate with being an Italian restaurant, none reasonably 
leads to properties of the sort of "being closed on the night when the sentence is 
uttered" .  This is why (44c) is also infelicitous as generic . 
We can now show that, unlike Lawler' s 1 973 essential I nonessential 
distinction, the combination of the two pragmatic-based presuppositional 
requirements on the choice of the "in virtue of', AS property indeed "slices the cake" 
correctly : All infelicitous IS sentences are those where (at least) one of the 
requirements on the "in virtue of', AS property isn 't met : being associated, from the 
point of view of w, with the subject property (/\P), or being a reasonable causer, from 
the point of view of w, of properties of the sort of the VP property (J\Ql 
Unlike IS sentences like (43a) or ( 44a-c), minimally contrasting BP ones (as in 
( 1 2), ( 1 3)  and ( 1 5) above) are perfectly felicitous as generic . This is because they can 
express "descriptive" generalizations, where the characterization of accessible worlds 
does involve any "in virtue of' property, and thus crucially, does not depend at all on 
satisfying real world knowledge requirements and assumptions concerning the subject 
and VP property . For example, even if the BP subject expresses an extremely 
unnatural property (as in ( 1 3a) and ( 1 3b) above), and no property can be associated 
with it, we can still easily find accessible worlds (those maximally similar to w except 
from possible having other P members) in which to evaluate the generalization, and 
thus such sentences are perfectly felicitous. Similarly, BP sentences like Men are 
blond I Uncles are garrulous etc. are perfectly fine as generic, since on the descriptive 
reading we don't care that there is no property, associated with the subject property, 
which also reasonably leads to properties of the sort of the VP property . This 
pragmatic based requirement is irrelevant to the definition of the accessibility relation. 
Thus, unlike IS sentences, BP ones can express the most bizarre generalizations, and 
still be felicitous . 
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6. The big "why" question : How to explain the difference in availability of 
accessibility relations ? 
The main claim made until now is that the variety of semantic, pragmatic and 
distributional differences between minimally contrasting IS and BP sentences result 
from the difference in availability of accessibility relations, which can be summarized 
in (47): 
(47) a. The generic quantiiier of IS sentences is only compatible with an '''in virtue 
of' accessibility relation . 
b. The generic quantifier of BP sentences is compatible with both an "in 
virtue of' and a "descriptive" accessibility relation . , 
1 17 
The obvious question to ask now, is how to explain this difference in 
availability of accessibility relations itself. In particular, how is this difference in the 
semantics of the two types of sentences (in terms of the different accessibility 
relations available) can be related to, and ideally derived from, the only surface 
difference between the two types of sentences, namely the distinction between the 
indefinite singular and bare plural NPs in these sentences? 
A preliminary, but nonetheless promising direction to take in answering this 
question is the following: Until now we followed the standard approach (e. g. 
Chierchia 1 995, ter-Meulen 1 995,  Wilkinson 1 99 1 ,  Link 1 995) according to which IS 
NPs denote property expressions, whereas BP NPs are ambiguous : they denote 
property expressions in quantificational - modal (1-) generic sentences (like Dogs 
bark), and kind referring terms in Direct Kind Predication generics (e. g. Dodos are 
extinct / Rats reached Australia in 1 770). Consequently, aside from the accessibility 
relation, minimally contrasting IS  and BP sentences (like A dog barks and Dogs bark ) 
were represented equally, as in (48) : 
(48) "v'w' [w' is appropriately accessible from wl � 
["v'x,s [dog(x,w') /\ C(s ,x,w' )] � [bark (s,x,w' )]] 
To start explaining the difference in availability of accessibility relations, 
however, we can now make use of an alternative view (e.g. Krifka et al 1 995,  
Chierhica 1998, Delfitto 1997, Cohen 1 999)), according to which BP NPs can (or 
even must) denote kinds also in quantificational/modal generics like Dogs have (Our 
legs / Men are blond / Boys don 't crv etc. Adopting such a view we will continue to 
represent both such IS and BP sentences as quantificational, modalized tripartite 
structure. However, whereas with IS sentences the restriction of Gen continues to 
contain a property expression, with BP ones the restriction of Gen will contain a kind 
expreSSIOn. 
There are several possible ways as to how to integrate a kind referring term 
into the quantificational-modal structure of BP sentences. One possibility, in the spirit 
of von Fintel 1 994, is to take BP sentences to express quantification over minimal 
situations which involve existentially quantified individuals realizing the kind, as in 
(49) : 
(49) Gen s [3x R(x,DOGS) /\ Involvemm(s,x)] ::; [3x R(x, DOGS) /\ barkmin(s,x)] 
Paraphrase : In all accessible worlds every minimal situation, involving 
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some individual realizing the kind "dogs", is part of (or - can be 
extended to) a mjnimal barking situation involving some realization of the 
kind "dogs" 
Another possibility is to assume that BP sentences involve "Modalized Kind 
Predication" (in Delfitto' s  1 997 terminology), as in (50): 
(50) A.;c. Gen s [Involve (s,x)] � [bark (s,x)] (DOGS)] 
Paraphrase The set of individuals for which, every relevant situation in 
all accessible worlds is a barking situation, has the kind "dogs" as a 
member. 
A third, similar, possibility is
' to take BP sentences to involve quantification 
over all situations involving the kind (as in (5 I a» , and assume that at this stage the 
accessibility relation is determined. Only after the accessibility relation is fixed the 
kind term is typed shifted into the set of realizations of the kind (as in Chierchia' s  
1998, Krifka et aI ' s  1 995 and Cohen's 1 999 suggestions), so we end up quantifying 
over all situations involving a realization of the kind dog (as in (5 Ib » :  
(5 1 ) a. Gen s [ C(s,DOGS)] � [bark (s,DOGS)] ] 
Paraphrase :  Any contextually relevant situation involving the kind " dogs" 
is a barking situation (in all accessible worlds). 
b. \;;ix,s [ R(x, DOGS) /\ C(s,x)] � [bark (s,x)] 
Paraphrase :  Any contextually relevant situation involving any instance 
of the dog kind is a barking situation (in all accessible worlds). 
I will not now attempt to decide which of these possibilities is the best. The 
assumption which stands behind all of them is that it is the presence of the kind term 
in the restriction of Gen, rather than a property expression, which somehow leads to 
the difference in availability of accessibility relations. But how exactly ? 
The answer to this question lies in a closer examination of the linguistic 
behavior of kind terms. No matter whether one takes kinds to be basic entities in the 
model (like Carlson 1 977, and Cohen 1 999), or some type of intensional group 
entities (as Chierchia 1 99 8  and Dobrovie Sorin & Laca 1 996), the relevant point for 
the present discussion is that, as convincingly shown already by Carlson 1 977 (and 
more recently by Chierchia 1 998), kind denoting NPs pattern like individual denoting 
NPs, i .e. proper names and definite descriptions, in a variety of diagnostical 
constructions (w.r. t. to scope ambiguities, in the so called "so called" construction, 
etc . ) .  The crucial point for us is that this similarity seems to hold also with respect to 
the type of modality or "nonaccidentalness" involved. 
For example, Carlson 1 995 claims that the salient reading of classic habituals 
with proper name subjects, as in (52a), usually represented as in (52b), is that of a 
"weak descriptive generalization" . In our terms, sentences like (52a) have a 
"descriptive" accessibility relation: 
(52) a. John walks to school 
b. Gen s [ C(sj)] � [walk to school (s,j)] 
There are also habituals with proper name subjects which are ambiguous 
between the "in virtue of' and the "descriptive" accessibility relations, just like many 
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BP sentences . For example the classic (53),  can either have the "'in virtue of' reading 
paraphrased in (54a), or the descriptive one, paraphrased in (54b): 
(53) Mary handles the mail form Antarctica 
(54) a. "In virtue of her job contract Mary is handling mail from Antarctica in all 
relevant situations" 
b. "That Mary is handling mail from Antarctica in all relevant situations is 
not accidental (with no specification of the "in virtue of' factor), '  
What seems to emerge from this comparison between BP sentences and 
habituals with proper name subjects is the generalization in (55) :  
, 
(55) a. When Gen is restricted by a property expression (as in A dog barks) 
only the "in virtue of' accessibility relation is available 
b. When Gen is restricted by an individual expression (as in Dogs bark / 
Fido barks) both the "in virtue of' and "descriptive" accessibility 
relations are available. 
But what is the reason for this correlation between the property / individual 
nature of the element restricting Gen, and the "in virtue of' / "descriptive" 
accessibility relations (which restrict the set of worlds we quantify over) ? 
A possible preliminary answer to this question is based on two further 
assumptions . The first is that with natural language generics the characterization of 
the accessibility relation is made under the assumption that the entity restricting Gen 
is a natural entity . The second is that there is a significant difference between what we 
perceive to be natural properties, and natural individuals . 
Intuitively, properties are considered natural only to the extent we have some 
pre-knowledge about them, i .e .  if we associate other properties with them. Put in other 
words , natural properties systematically "bring with them" associated properties . In 
contrast, individuals can be considered perfectly natural even if we have no 
preknowledge, stereotypes, norms etc . associated with them. This idea seems rather 
reasonable when we think about individuals referred to by proper name (like "Temer" 
- even if one associates no property with the individual denoted by this name, it will 
not be perceived as an unnatural individual) . Crucially, however, I believe it holds 
even when the individual is referred to by definite descriptions (like The tall man with 
the blue hat / the spy) or by kind referring bare plurals (dogs, blond uncles with six 
names) . Although these latter descriptions contain predicate expressions, of which we 
naturally have real world knowledge, their use is only to help pick out an individual 
(obj ect or kind level) . In Donnelan' s 1 966 terms, these referring expressions are used, 
or at least can be used, referentially and not attributively. 
Notice that I am not claiming that natural individuals cannot be associated 
with properties , only that, unlike what happens with properties , such an association is 
not necessarily needed for considering them natural.  Thus, many people may associate 
various properties with the individuals denoted by the proper name and definite 
descriptive "Shakespeare", and "The man who works in this office", respectively. 
Crucially, however, even a person who has no idea who Shakespeare was, or a person 
who knows nothing about this office, will have no problem considering the 
individuals denoted by these NPs "natural individuals". In the case of properties, on 
the other hand, the association of properties is necessary, and systematically required, 
in order to consider them natural. E .g. the property "being a brown haired person born 
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at the beginning of July" is considered so unnatural exactly because we associated 
with it no (nontrivial) other properties. 
Now, when uttering a characterizing generic, we are making a nonaccidental 
generalization. I. e. we are claiming that a certain generalization holds in other 
possible worlds, .accessible from the actual one. From the point of view of generics, 
the decision on which worlds will be consi.dered accessible (i.e. in which worlds we 
will evaluate the generalization) is sensitive to the kind of natural entity - individual 
or property - that the generalization is about. 
Since natural properties (denoted by IS subjects) systematically come with 
their associated properties, i .e .  some real world knowledge about them is 
systematically and prominently present, the similarity of the accessible worlds to ours 
systematically makes use of this assumed real world knowledge, and defines the \ 
worlds similar to ours in terms of some shared real world knowledge associated with 
the property restricting the generic operator (a� in the "in virtue of' accessibility 
relation). In contrast, since natural individuals (denoted by proper names, definite 
descriptions and BP NPs) are not systematically associated with properties, the 
decision on the type of similarity of accessible worlds to our world cannot rely on 
such associated properties, and hence can always be defined in a defau1� and vague 
way, as with the "descriptive" accessibility relation. In addition, in many cases, where 
it is reasonable to associate "in virtue of' properties with the kind denoted by the BP 
subj ect, the "in virtue of' accessibility relation is also available. 
These suggestions are, of course, very intuitive and preliminary. Further 
research should now continue to check whether and how they can be independently 
motivated and more precisely formulated 
7. Sum mary 
The main claims made in this paper can be summarized as follows: 
(*) In addition to the classic kind / characteristics (DIl) genericity distinction there 
is another distinction in the generic domain between two types of 
characterizing, 1- generics, expressing "In virtue of' and "descriptive" 
generalizations 
(*) This distinction is syntactically encoded in English: BP sentences can express 
both types of generalizations, whereas IS sentences can only express the 
former ones. 
(*) Both types of sentences express nonaccidental generalizations over individuals 
and situations, and have a basically equivalent tripartite quantificational 
modalized structure : this accounts for the strong similarities between the two 
types of sentences. 
(* ) The two types of generalizations differ in the type of accessibility relation 
restricting the modalized Gen operator, i.e.  in the choice of accessible worlds 
where the generalizations are evaluated. These differences between the 
accessibility relations - in terms of the degree of similarity of accessible 
worlds to the actual one, and the presence vs. absence of real world knowledge 
requirements in the characterization of accessible worlds - account for the 
semantic, pragmatic and distributional differences between minimally 
contrasting IS and BP sentences, which until now did not get a satisfactory 
characterization / account. 
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(*)  A promising direction t o  explain the difference in availability o f  accessibility 
relations between IS and BP sentences, is to derive it from the interpretation of 
the entity restricting Gen: a property expression (in the case of IS sentences), 
or a kind referring expression (in the case of BP sentences), while assuming a 
systematic difference between natural properties and natural individuals. This 
direction is supported by the similar type of modality expressed by both BP 
sentences and simple habitual sentences with proper name subj ects . 
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1 Following Chierhchia 1 995 I assume here that we get exactly the same structure, 
with quantification over situations, also when the VP expresses an individual-level 
property, e. g. with A dog has four legs and Dogs have four legs. 
2 The tolerance of exceptions of both IS and BP sentences can be captured by further 
restricting the set of worlds by some "normal" /"stereotypical" ordering source (as 
suggested by Krifka et al 1 995),  or by further restricting the set of individuals (and 
situations) by some "domain vague" restriction, (e . g. as in Kadmon & Landman' s  
1 993 suggestion, developed i n  Greenberg 2002). The exact choice o f  the mechanism 
for tolerating exceptions is not crucial for the claims I make below. 
3 In Greenberg 1 99 8  and 2002 I showed that temporally restricted BP sentences as in 
( 1 6) are indeed (1-) generic , and not e .g.  "quasi-universal" (in Condoravdi' s  1 996 
terms). E. g. they support counterfactuals,  tolerate legitimate exceptions and obey 
C ohen's  1 999 "homogeneity constrainf', just like standard (1-) generics like Dogs 
have four legs. 
4 Similar suggestions are found in Dobrovie-Sorin & laca 1 996 and Cohen 200 l .  
5But not only in English. A similar semantic distinction seems to be manifested in the 
syntax of other languages , e . g. in French - through the distinction between sentences 
with the determiner les and those with des (see de Swart 1 994 who quotes in this 
respect Calier 1 9 89), and, as pointed out to me by Greg Carlson (p. c. ), also in some 
African languages, e. g. Swahili, through the distinction between generic sentences 
with and without an overt marker hu. 
6 The distinction between these two types of generalizations is  similar to, and to a 
large extent inspired by Carlson' s  1 995 intuitive distinction between the "rules and 
regulations" and the "inductive" approaches to genericity. Carlson, however, 
suggested we should choose which of these approaches is better in analyzing generic 
sentences. In contrast, my claim is that there is no need to choose, since both types of 
generalizations are expressed in natural language . (See also Cohen 200 1 for a similar 
claim, and Greenberg 2002 for a discussion of the differences between Cohen' s theory 
and the present one). 
1 22 Yael Greenberg 
7 Another possible way to phrase the problem is to say that if the requirement that 
"J\S is associated with I\p in w" isn't  met, the whole antecedent of the universal 
quantification over worlds is false , and thus the domain of accessible worlds we 
universally quantify over is empty. This leads to the trivial truth of the whole 
universal quantification, which in tum leads to infelicity. Notice that a similar thing 
happens not only with universal quantification over worlds, but also with universal 
quantification over individuals, as shown, e.g. in de Jong and Verkuyl 1 984.  E.g. the 
sentence Every male student in my class got above 80 is infelicitous if the domain of 
male students in my class is empty. 
8In Greenberg 2002 I show that this additional presupposition need not be stipulated, 
but is conversationally triggered by a combination of the existing truth conditions of 
IS sentences and the Grician maxim of quality. 
9 In this sense, the two restrictions on J\S formally capture Chierchia' s 1 995  intuition 
concerning the double restriction on the set of conditions ("felicity conditions") which 
define the accessible worlds of generics : 
"Actually, it seems intuitively that there are two kinds of contextual 
restrictions [on the set of felicity conditions] . One comes, as it were, from 
the verb; it determines what conditions have to be met for an individual to 
undertake an action. The other comes from the noun; it determines what 
features of the species are relevant for the action ." (p. 1 96) 
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